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Abstract Market-based instruments (MBIs) have emerged as a popular approach to
balance development and conservation objectives. However, their ability to accomplish
this is often beset by poor implementation in practice. This is testament to a widening gap
between the rate of policy development and implementation of MBIs and the maturity of
research and evaluation on their design, and impact on affected stakeholders. Within this
context, this paper examines multi-stakeholder perspectives to the adoption of Biodiversity
Offsetting in England, an instrument designed to enable biodiversity losses in one place to
be compensated through conservation improvements elsewhere. Analysis reveals issues
associated with social and ecological compensation of biodiversity loss. Findings suggest
that there is a need for a broader consideration of issues surrounding distributive justice,
access to nature and the status of ownership over sites of common heritage when
accounting for biodiversity loss and its compensation. This message is salient to both the
study context as well as the burgeoning international practice of Biodiversity Offsetting.
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1 Introduction
Markets are increasingly seen as both part of the problem and part of the solution in relation to
contemporary environmental challenges. The emergence of markets in water quality, biodi-
versity and carbon sequestration is indicative of nature being subsumed within prevailing
systems of commodity production and exchange (Robertson 2012). Such is the pace of this
change that nature, people and their relationships are increasingly caught between the balance
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sheets of national accounting systems and the yardstick of the market (Robertson 2000, 2004).
The former tries to package nature into neat categories and functional units while the latter
helps to translate these into a price that can be understood and traded by markets across
geographical space (Dempsey and Suarez 2016). Some argue that this process overlooks
broader values associated with nature (Braun and Castree 1998; Dempsey and Robertson
2012; Sullivan and Hannis 2015; Apostolopoulou and Adams 2017). However, others believe
that creating markets of environmental goods and services has tremendous potential for
maximising the protection of ecosystems and biodiversity (Balmford 2002; Sutherland et al.
2006; TEEB 2008; Kettunen and Vihervaara 2012; Helm and Hepburn 2014). They attest that,
within the context of economic decision-making, nature has a null value, and is undervalued
and over-exploited as a result (von Hase and ten Kate 2017). It follows, ascribing a value to
nature presents a business cost to its extraction and bears a profit for its protection, placing
markets, people and the planet on a corrective path for sustainable growth.
Within the context of biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation, market-based
instruments (MBIs) have emerged as a way to reconcile development needs and conser-
vation objectives (Go´mez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Reid 2011). The appetite for MBIs has
risen in response to growing disillusionment with prevailing, non-market-based approaches
to conservation (Redford and William 2009). Traditional forms of command-and-control
regulation, which adopt a prescriptive and top-down approach to conservation, are viewed
as inherently inefficient and inflexible, costly to enforce, and prone to regulatory capture
(Mol et al. 2009; Pautz and Wamsley 2012). Conversely, voluntary approaches to conser-
vation have had mixed results (cf. Santangeli et al. 2016 and McCarthy and Morling 2015)
with their success highly contingent on the level of political will for environmental pro-
tection within the contexts they operate (Segerson 2013). Meanwhile, community-based
conservation which integrates social development goals with conservation objectives has
proved successful at a local-scale through bottom-up understanding of local cultural context
in intervention success (Brooks et al. 2012; Waylen et al. 2010); however, such approach is
limited when viewed against the backdrop of planetary-scale risks to ecosystems and bio-
diversity (Kellert et al. 2000; Barrett et al. 2001; Kiss 2004; Berkes 2007).
The widening gap between the rate of policy development of MBIs for conservation and
the maturity of critical scholarship on their theoretical and practical implications increases
the likelihood of ineffective and harmful policy interventions (Reid 2011; Roth and
Dressler 2012). The modest achievements of projects on payment for ecosystem services
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; McAfee 2012; Pokorny et al. 2013; Hejnowicz et al. 2014)
and carbon offsetting schemes (Corbera and Brown 2010; Knox-Hayes 2010; Cavanagh
and Benjaminsen 2014; Klinsky 2015) are symptomatic of this. There is currently poor
articulation of the economic, institutional and ecological conditions in which MBIs for
conservation are most effective (Robinson 2006; Go´mez-Baggethun et al. 2010; Wissel
and Wa¨tzold 2010). There are also very few shared characteristics between different
instruments, limiting their reproducibility across space (Pirard 2012). Extrapolating the
success of one instrument or study site to another, in the absence of contextual information,
often results in uneven success and implementation of approaches (Landell-Mills and
Porras 2002). An empirical, case-specific inquiry is key in this regard.
This article examines stakeholder perspectives to the design and use of Biodiversity
Offsetting, an infant conservation MBI, within conservation practice in England. It is based
on in-depth interviews with key conservation stakeholders in England. The study area
reflects the fact conservation practice in the UK is devolved within England, Scotland,
Wales and Ireland. Responses were coded using a three-cycle approach to produce a
conceptually rich understanding of the practical and theoretical challenges presented by
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Biodiversity Offsetting in England, which is currently lacking (Bull et al. 2013; Evans
et al. 2015; Hackett 2016). Coding counts indicate that ecological compensation (X = 604)
and social compensation (X = 593) are both important in the design and implementation of
Biodiversity Offsetting.
2 Theoretical and practical challenges to Biodiversity Offsetting
In the last 50 years, England’s ecological network has experienced mounting stress from
economic development (Lawton et al. 2010). Over this period, 60% of UK species have
declined (Burns et al. 2013). Such a trend is particularly concerning given the link between
biodiversity loss and degradation of ecosystem services which deliver cultural benefits
(Fuller et al. 2007; Albon et al. 2014; Oliver et al. 2015).
Biodiversity Offsetting has been promoted by the English Government as a tool to
appease the longstanding conflict between economic development and biodiversity con-
servation. Offering developers the chance to purchase credits from actions with positive
biodiversity outcomes in order to ‘‘offset’’ adverse biodiversity impacts from their own
development activities (eftec et al. 2010), Biodiversity Offsets are designed to ensure there
is no net loss (or a net gain) in ecological value (Parliamentary Office of Science and
Technology 2011). Biodiversity Offsetting is often referred to within the context of the
mitigation hierarchy, a sequence of abatement stages to reduce negative biodiversity impact
during development. Assuming attempts are made to reduce biodiversity loss, by avoiding
and minimising impacts or addressing damage done through restoration (BBOP 2013),
Biodiversity Offsetting is intended to compensate for any residual biodiversity impact. The
use of Biodiversity Offsetting—and the application of the no net loss principle—is proposed
to be applied to compensate for biodiversity loss specifically on non-protected sites of
which current regulation permits in less than 1 in a 1000 planning applications (Baker et al.
2013). However, the UK’s decision to leave the European Union may extend the reach of
Biodiversity Offsetting to sites currently afforded protection under the EU Birds (79/409/
EEC) and Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) unless commensurate protection is put in its
place (European Commission 2008). In 2012, the UK Department for Environment, Food &
Rural Affairs (Defra) established a series of pilot sites around England, in Devon, Don-
caster, Essex, Greater Norwich, Nottinghamshire, Warwickshire and Coventry and Solihull.
These pilots, concluding in April 2014, tested the efficacy of Biodiversity Offsetting to
deliver infrastructure development and conservation commitments for England in tandem
(Defra 2013b). Discussion of the practical challenges associated with Biodiversity Offset-
ting provides a useful context to the issues exposed in this study.
From a temporal perspective, one major challenge Biodiversity Offsetting faces is
permitting offsets where compensation for biodiversity loss occurs over an extended period
(Bull et al. 2013), since processes such as soil formation, tree growth, and the development
of biophysical habitats are slow relative to human time frames (Moilanen et al. 2009).
Development of habitats is also inherently uncertain. To account for uncertainty and to
satisfy no net loss criteria, offsets must be set at significantly higher ratios, in ecological
terms, than the original sites destroyed (Moilanen et al. 2009; Pickett et al. 2013). How-
ever, observations show existing Biodiversity Offsetting schemes seldom deliver com-
pensation stipulated by no net loss (Kettlewell et al. 2008; Robertson and Hayden 2008).
The time lag between a development and an offset also presents ambiguity in determining
how long the offset should be maintained, by whom, and whether this commitment could
diminish if the political and legal landscape changes (Bull et al. 2013).
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The modest success of the US Mitigation Banking programme (EPA 2015), the longest
running Biodiversity Offsetting scheme in existence, exemplifies the practical challenges
associated with non-state actors mediating Biodiversity Offsetting. In the US state of Ohio,
Kettlewell et al. (2008) found two-thirds of projects were unsuccessful in restoring the
wetland area stipulated by their permit, and permits allowed different wetland types to be
interchanged during compensation, resulting in net biodiversity loss. In Massachusetts,
Robertson and Hayden (2008) found 21% of developers made no attempt at building the
offset site, and schemes that were successful provided compensation at a lower overall
ratio than non-bank forms of compensation. Meanwhile, a quantitative functional assess-
ment of 40 riparian mitigation projects in Orange County, California, found none of the
projects were ‘‘functionally successful’’, as defined by the successful restoration of
hydrology, biogeochemistry and habitats (Ambrose 2000). Laurance et al. (2015) assert
that biodiversity offsets are far too often used as a crude form of damage control in
response to poorly conducted environmental impact assessments. Furthermore, there are
several instances in which biodiversity cannot meaningfully be replaced with no net loss in
ecological value, leading to irreversible loss of biodiversity (BBOP 2013); this is partic-
ularly true for mitigation involving translocation of species (Pilgrim et al. 2013).
A further caveat of Biodiversity Offsetting is demonstrating ‘‘additionality’’, the addi-
tional biodiversity gained from an offset site against a business-as-usual scenario (Maron
et al. 2010; Bull et al. 2013). This requires appraisal of baseline biodiversity and ecosystem
functioning to isolate the effect of the conservation intervention. However, detractors of
Biodiversity Offsetting suggest that meaningfully evaluating such counterfactuals is
unfeasible based on the 20-min site assessment recommended in the government guidance
paper (Defra 2013b; Environmental Audit Committee 2013).
3 Methods
3.1 Stakeholders
Stakeholder groups and individual respondents were carefully identified with respect to
their knowledge of, and engagement with the design and implementation of biodiversity
offsetting in England. Extant literature, professional networks, and a corpus of news
articles and editorials on Biodiversity Offsetting were used to identity suitable stakeholder
groups and individual respondents.
At the time of data collection, grey literature was more abundant than peer-reviewed
literature on the topic of Biodiversity Offsetting in England and revealed two key stake-
holder groups working at the interface of science, policy and business. First, local planning
authorities (LPA), which are responsible for overseeing compliance of Biodiversity Off-
setting pilots in the England. Participants in this group were well positioned to explain the
protocols involved in Biodiversity Offsetting and the practical challenges they face in an
institutional policy setting. Second was offset brokers (OB): organisations and individuals
commissioned by developers to administer biodiversity offsets; early research into biodi-
versity offsetting in England indicates such group is focal within the emergence of offset
projects (Hannis and Sullivan 2012).
Using the search function of the LinkedIn online professional network (search terms:
‘‘Biodiversity Offsetting’’ and ‘‘Biodiversity Offsets’’), we found a number of academic
researchers (AR) with research expertise in the field of Biodiversity Offsetting and
1810 O. Taherzadeh, P. Howley
123
restorative ecology. Meanwhile, we identified one small (Save our Woods), one medium-
sized (FERN), and one large (Friends of the Earth) environmental and social justice
organisations all actively investigating the implications of Biodiversity Offsetting in
England and the EU; this group was categorised as environmental campaigners (EC). In
total, we interviewed 12 respondents, three in each of the four stakeholder groups
(Table 1). Descriptions of participants are provided in ‘‘Appendix 1’’.
3.2 Interview structure
We used a combination of face-to-face and telephone interviews which were recorded with
the permission of respondents and transcribed verbatim by the authors (see online sup-
plementary material for full transcripts dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse.xhtml?alias=
biodiversityoffsetting). The interview protocol featured a series of open-ended questions
in the form of a semi-structured interview guide (see ‘‘Appendix 2’’). This was based on a
synthesis of the literature and ongoing discourse around Biodiversity Offsetting. A key line
of inquiry in interviews related to the ‘‘Defra metric’’ for Biodiversity Offsetting, com-
posed of three criteria for calculating the level of ecological compensation (‘‘biodiversity
units’’) between a development site and offset site, as outlined in the Government green
paper (Defra 2013b): habitat type, condition and area. This metric was principally chosen
for its simplicity to assess and fulfil ecological compensation required after infrastructure
development, although it’s the strengths and weaknesses within the context of compen-
sation for biodiversity loss were explored in more detail with respondents.
The interview guide for this study was amended after administering a pilot survey prior
to the main round of interviews. We adapted the guide during the interviews based on the
expertise of different stakeholders using memo notes and directed further questions to
respondents to draw upon their experiences and concerns.
3.3 Interview coding
We subjected the interview transcripts to three rounds of coding (open, axial and selective)
in order to realise the full value of the data and the underlying meaning of the responses
(Strauss and Corbin 1991; Glaser and Strauss 2009). The first stage of coding—open
coding—involved fracturing of data in order to examine, compare, conceptualise and
Table 1 Stakeholder groups, descriptions and abbreviations
Stakeholder group Description Abbreviation
Academic
researchers
Recognised experts in ecology who have also provided input to
consultations on Biodiversity Offsetting design and implementation
in England
AR [1, 2, 3]
Offset brokers Prospective accreditation bodies responsible for brokering credit
trading in biodiversity offset credits in England between developers
and land owners
OB [1, 2, 3]
Environmental
campaigners
Individuals representing environmental NGO organisations (large and
small) with active campaigns related to biodiversity offsetting in
England
EC [1, 2, 3]
Local planning
authorities
Senior local government ecologists responsible for designing and
implementing Defra biodiversity offsetting pilot schemes in their
respective authorities
LPA [1, 2, 3]
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extract meaning from participant responses (Strauss and Corbin 1991). This involves a
line-by-line analysis of the interview transcriptions, where the analyst writes memos about
conceptual and theoretical ideas which emerge during the analysis (Walker 2006). Axial
coding is then used to reassemble data, by relating concepts (or subcategories) to broader,
more abstract categories. During this exercise, the practitioner will begin to consider
‘‘…causal conditions, phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, action/interaction and
consequences’’ (Halaweh 2012). Selective coding refers to the final stage of analysis; here,
the analyst selects a core category as a vehicle for the subsumption of other categories
(Benaquisto 2008). During this phase, the analyst can begin to construct a framework using
themes from previous coding cycles (Bryman and Burgess 1994). The analytical product
which emerges from this systematic coding process helps to integrate existing theory and
build the analysts’ research agenda by exposing new areas of scholarship (Dey 1999).
To illustrate the significance of different concepts highlighted during the coding pro-
cess, the number of occurrences of a specific concept within interviews was recorded,
denoted by X = occurrence count.
4 Results
Two central themes emerged from analysis of the interviews: ecological compensation,
which reflects the theoretical and practical challenges associated with implementing
Biodiversity Offsetting; and social compensation, which captures the social justice and
equity issues surrounding Biodiversity Offsetting. Below we outline the steps followed to
characterise the stakeholder interviews. Section subheadings have been included at levels
where it is useful to distinguish different sub-themes. Figure 1 depicts all themes within a
coding tree.
4.1 Ecological compensation
Stakeholder interviews identified challenges surrounding implementation (X = 299) and
valuing biodiversity (X = 305) as most important to the level of ecological compensation
delivered within a Biodiversity Offsets. The theme of implementation reflected the regu-
latory environment {X = 234} surrounding Biodiversity Offsetting and how these were
shaped by policy context {X = 65}. Within the context of the regulatory environment for
Biodiversity Offsetting, respondents identified several important factors: National context
{X = 61}; regulation of offsets {X = 52}; the extent to which biodiversity offsetting
strengthened {X = 17} or undermined {X = 29} the protection of nature and its effect on
adherence to the mitigation hierarchy {X = 28}; government versus governance in the
management of Biodiversity Offsetting {X = 23}; and, whether simplification of planning
and development was likely to deliver greater protection of biodiversity {X = 22}. In
reference to policy context respondents reflected failures of the current system of planning
and conservation practice {X = 28}, the creep of neo-liberalism into the problemitisation
of, and response to biodiversity loss {X = 27}, and the extent to which Biodiversity
Offsetting was given greater credence as a policy instrument as a result of austerity and its
impact on the regulatory resources of local authorities {X = 10}.
The theme of valuing biodiversity relates to the proposed parameters when calculating
biodiversity offsets {X = 208}, reflecting issues of equivalence {X = 40}, proximity
{X = 36}, the simplicity of Defra metric {X = 31}, uncertainty {X = 28}, base lines and
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additionality {X = 26}, longevity {X = 25}, ecosystem services {X = 22} and multiple
interpretation of the Defra metric {X = 18}; and, economic valuation {X = 97} within the
context of conservation, reflecting issues around marketising nature {X = 57}, under-
standing and communicating value {X = 38} and the potential similarities between carbon
offsetting and biodiversity offsetting in relation to rogue trading of environmental credits
{X = 4}.
4.1.1 Implementation
Respondents perceived lack of effective implementation, long-term monitoring and
stakeholder participation as key barriers to achieving meaningful ecological compensation
under Biodiversity Offsetting. The failure of the established legal compliance within the
planning system to adequately protect biodiversity was a recurring issue. However, each
stakeholder group identified different causes of policy failure. Local planning authority
respondent 1 (LPA1), for example, attributed the failure to a lack of ‘‘forward planning for
biodiversity’’, emphasising the need to go
… through the mitigation hierarchy at the pre-site allocation stage of the plan so that
any sensitive sites are knocked out before they even get into the system for
development.
Despite proponents of Biodiversity Offsetting viewing it as a last resort to mitigating
biodiversity loss (BBOP 2013), academic researchers and environmental campaigners
warned that such an instrument could promote a lackadaisical approach in earlier stages of
site mitigation, and that improving avoidance of biodiversity impacts was central to
reducing biodiversity loss. As Dempsey (2013) notes, the practice of screening sites helps
in part to designate ‘‘no go’’ zones for business, but also helps appropriate ‘‘go zones’’
where developers can exercise less care over biodiversity issues.
According to offset brokers, the difficulty of implementing Biodiversity Offsetting is
rooted in the problems developers face in navigating the labyrinth of regulations, jargon
and bureaucratic procedures within the existing legal compliance to protect ecosystems and
biodiversity:
They’re [businesses] inherently grappling with quite complex and challenging
issues… and have been bombarded with all this kind of stuff about green infras-
tructure and ecosystem services… all these kind of clunky phrases that they don’t
really understand. (EC1)
Meanwhile, there was disagreement over whether the implementation of Biodiversity
Offsetting would strengthen or undermine existing legal regulations protecting the Eng-
land’s ecological network. Local planning authorities and offset brokers felt Biodiversity
Offsetting would supplement existing legislation protecting habitats and species. However,
environmental campaigners warned that Biodiversity Offsetting created
shades of grey, where there were not any before, over what can and cannot be
developed on. (EC1)
Accordingly, EC2 cited a case where a previously rejected planning application was
subsequently resubmitted, then granted, on the grounds that biodiversity loss could be
offset elsewhere. Within this context, environmental campaigners regarded ‘‘no loss’’ and
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‘‘no net loss’’ policy goals as fundamentally different, with the latter assuming a far weaker
sustainability paradigm,
because you don’t get an offset site without a site being destroyed. (EC2).
Conversely, academic researchers were concerned by the widening gap between policy
rhetoric surrounding Biodiversity Offsetting and the practical and theoretical evidence
base. AR1 expressed concern over poor design of the Biodiversity Offsetting pilot schemes
in England:
I can see on the ground, the things on the ground implemented for mitigation, there
has been no research done on them at all as to whether they actually work… We’ve
spent a lot of money and it’s not ecologically delivering at all.
Similarly, AR3 alluded to a gap between corporate commitments to deliver no net loss
or net gain biodiversity targets—a growing phenomenon (Rainey et al. 2015)—and the
necessary knowledge and experience required to fulfil these commitments. Moreover, they
cited the transition from no net loss and net gain outcomes in offset projects as ‘‘difficult’’
and ‘‘…a lot of extra work’’ despite being perceived as ‘‘quite small [in terms of effort]’’—
a view substantiated in Bull and Brownlie (2017).
There was also disagreement between stakeholders on the purported benefits Biodi-
versity Offsetting would deliver. While offset brokers envisaged biodiversity offsetting
would produce net gains to biodiversity, academic researchers and environmental cam-
paigners challenged the ecological evidence of a no net loss goal:
If you put the footprint of a building down, I’m not convinced you’re getting No Net
Loss, however great your mitigation is. (AR1)
AR2 noted that:
Just thinking you can kind of create a similar habitat somewhere else immediately de
novo is pretty naı¨ve… for anything more complex like a woodland or a salt marsh,
then you are probably being very optimistic, even heroic, in thinking you can do it.
Despite disagreement over the effectiveness of Biodiversity Offsetting, several
respondents felt the tool should be made mandatory for businesses and infrastructure
development if the government insisted on implementing it. AR1 recalled practical issues
with the voluntary nature of Biodiversity Offsetting in pilot studies, recounting:
people on the ground involved in the pilots were saying we’re having real trouble
getting developers to sign up to this.
However, AR3 challenged the high status of Biodiversity Offsetting has received in
recent conservation discourse in the UK:
This is the mistake I think we have made in the UK so far. I think there has been this
immediate leap towards Biodiversity Offsetting which is a controversial mechanism
and isn’t a proven mechanism yet, even though it has had some success in some parts
of the world. The focus should be on no net loss and I think people are starting to
realise that now.
Similarly, LPA3 agreed with the use of a metric in principle, but was ‘‘not convinced
offsetting itself should be made mandatory’’.
Although Biodiversity Offsetting, as defined by Defra (2013a, b, p. 8) is expected to
‘‘observe the mitigation hierarchy’’, the (dis)incentives it creates for adherence to the
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mitigation hierarchy is unclear. Indeed, an assessment of the biodiversity offsetting pilot
schemes in England by Baker et al. (2014, p. 64) found the use of the (Defra 2013a, b)
metric for biodiversity ‘‘…tended to support the application of the mitigation hierarchy.
However, within the pilot programme there were some applications where biodiversity
offsetting was presented as a validated route for compensation and this may have under-
mined the hierarchy’’.
4.1.1.1 Regulatory environment With respect to regulation and enforcement, all stake-
holders regarded the state as an important agent in mediating the implementation of
Biodiversity Offsetting, although they recognised that ongoing budget cuts to government
programmes and local authorities presented a major barrier to implementing, regulating
and enforcing Biodiversity Offsetting. LPA 1 commented:
look at the planning system at the moment, look at the flaws in it. The real lack of
ecologists. The biodiversity duty just not being properly considered at all within
many local authorities. It’s a resource problem, it’s massive cuts within local
authorities.
Similarly, OB1 noted:
we’ve got a local council whose budget is being stripped every single year and they
own a lot of biodiversity spots that they have no money to manage, no money to do
anything.
These observations bring into sharp focus the resource constraints to meaningfully
implementing and monitoring biodiversity offsets. Conservation practitioners are
increasingly expected to deliver adequate protection of ecosystems in an era of austerity
and dwindling financial resources (Comerford et al. 2010; Corson 2010; McCarthy et al.
2012; Apostolopoulou et al. 2014). Within this environment, it is assumed that non-state
actors and private investors will help bridge the shortfall between government provision of
public goods and that which is socially optimal (Reid 2011; Young 2015). However, often
this devolution of state power is not met with a fair reallocation of resources to local
authorities to support alternative service delivery mechanisms. Complex issues such as
redistributive justice and sustainability often become siloed, positioned in the problem
space of organisations, outside the purview of broader governance processes (Furlong and
Bakker 2010). In turn, communities increasingly become exposed to powerful corporate
interests, weakening their ability to resist developments (McCarthy and Prudham 2004;
Igoe and Brockington 2007).
Academic researchers and environmental campaigners viewed the increasing commit-
ments of the private sector to conservation activities as an inadequate replacement for
government provision of public goods. AR1 was concerned that money which is
meant to be additional to enhance areas or give additional land around SSSIs [Sites
of Special Scientific Interest] might creep into what should be the statutory duty of
government to be funding.
These sentiments were echoed by EC1, who was sceptical of the role of the private
sector to meaningfully supplement government provision of public goods. EC1 expressed
concern with:
the move towards a model, sadly in the UK where our environmental services or
environmental management or the caretaking role is being potentially handed over to
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the private sector. [Private sector actors are] only going to provide money if they get
something out of it and, you know, that’s something we haven’t quite grappled with
as environmentalists:… that they don’t do anything for free.
However, OB1 regarded the increasing role of private sector interest in conservation as a
… solution to corporate commitment on sustainable development [and] an absolute
god-send for most local authorities [whose] budgets are being slashed.
4.1.2 Valuing biodiversity
In addition to concerns around implementation, an additional perceived barrier related to
valuation of biodiversity and ecosystems (X = 305). We discerned two distinct discussions
around valuation of ecosystems and biodiversity. First, economic valuation (X = 97),
which considers whether biodiversity and ecosystems could, or indeed should, be mone-
tised. Second, the calculation of biodiversity offsets (X = 208), in which environmental
campaigners, academic researchers and local planning authorities highlighted several
issues with the proposed method of evaluating biodiversity loss and compensation.
4.1.2.1 Economic valuation The notion of monetising and marketing biodiversity offsets
was criticised by academic researchers and environmental campaigners. A key theme in
the academic researchers’ critique was the limitations of using valuation as a tool for
informing environmental management. AR1 suggested habitats that are ‘‘ecologically
irreplaceable’’ should not be given an economic value since ‘‘they can’t rebuild them in
any reasonable time scale’’. AR1 also emphasised a more intangible imperative for pro-
tecting the environment, commenting:
If we get into a complete viewpoint where everything we can put a monetary value
on it and all into economic terms and not consider our moral and almost spiritual
need for nature then that’s quite a depauperate way of viewing nature. So I think you
can use those tools with caution. But you need to step outside that and recognise both
the irreplaceable aspects of nature and moral, intrinsic aspects of nature you can’t
value.
Environmental campaigners offered a more critical perspective on this issue:
It’s a really sensible tool if we’re in an ideal, fluffy bunny world where everyone is
out for the best, but unfortunately that isn’t the way things are run… it’s going to
become a tool that enables the speeding through of development. (EC2)
Several respondents (AR1, EC1, OB1, OB2, OC3) acknowledged economic valuation
of ecosystems and biodiversity is important for agenda building. Respondents agreed
such exercises helped to raise awareness of the non-market benefits derived from nature.
OB1 also said environmental valuation was an invaluable communication tool in their
work:
… using numbers to translate and communicate biodiversity to the business people
has really transformed my work… it becomes so much more powerful in terms of
getting them [businesses] engaged…
However, all stakeholders agreed a Biodiversity Offsetting ‘‘market’’ demanded tight,
independent, regulation. AR1, EC1, OB2, OB3 cited the operational failure of carbon
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offsetting, and the proliferation of ‘‘rogue traders’’ offering carbon credits, as clear justi-
fication for certification of biodiversity offsets. AR1 warned that, without appropriate rules,
checks and balances, Biodiversity Offsetting could become ‘‘… a complete license to
trash’’. Indeed, in the context of poor governance, several people have argued Biodiversity
Offsetting would promote rent-seeking behaviour, whereby individuals use their property
assets to profit from offset provision without creating ‘‘new’’ habitats, leading to a net loss
in biodiversity (Walker et al. 2009; Bull et al. 2013). EC3 went so far as to condemn the
overall role of Biodiversity Offsetting as a tool for conservation, suggesting it offers
developers ‘‘entitlements’’ to destroy nature, whereby the availability to purchase biodi-
versity credits assigns newfound rights to do so. Here, metrics of ecological value support
the delineation of nature by usable and unusable space (Dempsey 2013). Meanwhile, LPA
respondents and AR1 raised concerns said that in their experience landowners show little
interest in or demand for becoming ‘‘offset providers’’—actors who earmark their land for
wildlife conservation to provide offset credits to nearby developments (Environment Bank
Ltd 2014). AR1 and LPA2 suggested landowners worked in short-term economic cycles of
3–5 years, so were reluctant to commit to permanent land use stipulated by 50–100-year
Biodiversity Offsetting agreements. They also suggested farmers a major focus group of
Biodiversity Offsetting may be averse to allocating land for non-agricultural use for cul-
tural reasons (e.g. having a productivist mindset). This view is substantiated by the Eng-
land’s National Farmers’ Union (2013) consultation response to Biodiversity Offsetting.
4.1.2.2 Calculating biodiversity offsets We detected divergence in respondents’ attitudes
towards the measurement of biodiversity credits. OB1 believed the use of the current
planning system provided local authorities and businesses with ‘‘no way of really quan-
tifying and knowing how good their work is’’. OB1 also suggested the Defra metric for
measuring biodiversity units would address inconsistencies within the compensation pro-
cess by tightening up the mitigation hierarchy and ‘‘casting a spotlight on it’’. This
standpoint was shared by LPA2, whose practical experience managing Biodiversity Off-
setting pilot schemes was mostly positive.
OB2 expressed similar confidence in the proposed Biodiversity Offsetting framework,
acknowledging that Biodiversity Offsetting is ‘‘not a perfect system’’ but ‘‘it is certainly
better than what is being delivered at the moment’’. OB2 went on to rationalise the use of
Biodiversity Offsetting on the grounds that the urgency of biodiversity loss requires
immediate remedy:
We need to do something and we need to do it now and strive for perfection in the
future.
The remaining stakeholders—the environmental campaigners, academic researchers
and LPA1—were more critical of the measurement procedures involved in calculating
biodiversity units, viewing them as shortsighted and highlighting systemic flaws in the
design and implementation of the proposed (Defra 2013b) metric for Biodiversity Off-
setting in England.
AR2 distinguished between Biodiversity Offsetting as ‘‘a generic process’’ and Biodi-
versity Offsetting as proposed by the government green paper (Defra 2013b). They were
confident that Biodiversity Offsetting ‘‘as a generic process’’ could certainly afford species
greater protection, but despaired of the method proposed in the green paper:
Biodiversity Offsetting a` la green paper is probably fundamentally flawed in any
respect and may only help the planners. [It is] a dog’s breakfast of ill-defined stuff…
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a bit woolly and not very well put together and really talks about individual species
and not ecological processes.
Similarly, LPA1 regarded the proposed habitat metric as ‘‘too simplistic and inadequate
for what it should do’’. AR3 made several observations on the weaknesses of the Defra
metric. First they proposed a shift away from an ‘‘all-singing, all-dancing metric that can
do all different types of habitats’’ and restricting it to certain habitat types where it has been
shown to work. Second, they highlighted ‘‘baselines and counterfactuals’’ as a blind-spot
within the existing metric and recommended greater recognition of ‘‘background trends, a
baseline, and counterfactuals’’, to demonstrate ‘‘proactive habitat creation’’. Lastly, they
criticised the lack of empirical evidence used to determine multipliers for compensating
ecological value between a development site and offset site which they perceived to be
‘‘plucked out of the air’’.
Referring to the calculation of biodiversity units attained under the Defra metric, AR1
noted:
… if people start thinking that this is a highly developed science then there is a
risk… these numbers are broad representatives to try to do better than we do at the
moment, but compared to some other schemes they are quite laughable in their
simplicity.
Overall, local planning authorities, academic researchers and environmental cam-
paigners felt that Biodiversity Offsetting according to the green paper would fail to achieve
either social or ecological compensation, by overlooking issues of proximity, the irre-
placeability of nature, ecosystem services, longevity and discounting in ecological
compensation.
4.2 Social compensation
Analysis of stakeholder responses highlighted social compensation as an equally signifi-
cant component of Biodiversity Offsetting to ecological compensation, denoted by the
strong recurrence of two main themes in the responses: stakeholder inclusion (X = 278)
and social justice and equity (X = 315). Stakeholder inclusion concerned the level of
involvement of different conservation stakeholders in the design, development and
delivery of Biodiversity Offsetting, how this was shaped by the prevailing expert/non-
expert conservation paradigm, and the role of affected communities in defining the con-
ditions of an offset and involvement in its implementation. Social justice and equity
represented issues of community-related compensation associated with Biodiversity Off-
setting: procedural and consequential justice (X = 137); access to nature (X = 35); inter-
generational equity (X = 18); intra-generational equity (X = 17); and property rights
(X = 14), and how these were treated within the proposed Defra metric.
4.2.1 Stakeholder inclusion
Respondents identified stakeholder participation as an integral component to the successful
design and implementation of any conservation intervention. Offset Broker 1 emphasised
the propensity of Biodiversity Offsetting to build cohesive relationships between compa-
nies and wildlife organisations, by involving conservation groups in implementing bio-
diversity strategies. Yet environmental campaigners felt the alliance of businesses and
wildlife organisations within the design and implementation of Biodiversity Offsetting was
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being achieved at the expense of marginalising those local people most affected by
development and biodiversity loss:
my biggest concern throughout this whole process is people haven’t been consulted,
civil society, has knew nothing about it… communities went to those NGOs
expecting them to fight to protect local green space, only to then find out they were
part of it and they are on their own. (EC2)
Environmental campaigner 1 argued ‘‘communities are often the experts of the land-
scape’’ and hold rich information regarding the management needs of their local envi-
ronment, though felt this was being ignored by large wildlife organisations:
I’m always told by charities ‘‘oh people don’t care’’. I think that’s rubbish, people do
care and that’s why there is always a campaign kicking off when somebody wants to
cut down a tree. It’s just they are not given a chance to express that other than when
their landscape is threatened. So get them involved at the decision-making stage. Get
them involved way before the decision making stage.
Although academic researchers acknowledged the importance of wider stakeholder
participation, they highlighted significant barriers to social inclusion within the design and
implementation of Biodiversity Offsetting. They asserted that councils lacked the financial
resources to facilitate costly consultation processes (stakeholder forums and referendums)
and were instead forced to operate within a consequentialist mindset: preoccupied by
policy outcomes, not processes. Academic researchers emphasised a commensurate dearth
of experience and knowledge within local planning to meaningfully include civil society
within the formal apparatus of government policy-making. Instead, AR2 noted, power
dynamics within government policy-making resulted in powerful individuals monopolising
the issue-attention cycle of local authorities, eclipsing the needs of other stakeholders.
However, LPA1 disputed the importance of wider stakeholder participation, on the grounds
that affected communities ‘‘don’t have any ecological expertise’’. The limited extent to
which affected stakeholders within Biodiversity Offsetting projects inform their design,
implementation, and evaluation is likely to have a major implications for social com-
pensation. Indeed, meaningful stakeholder engagement in conservation interventions can
help to identify and address conflicts between different interest groups by finding overlap
between outcomes (Redpath et al. 2013; Reed 2008).
4.2.2 Social equity and justice
Several respondents raised concerns around the treatment of social equity and justice
within the current apparatus of Biodiversity Offsetting. The majority of stakeholders
agreed there was a poor articulation of equity issues within the existing Biodiversity
Offsetting guidelines in England. AR2 emphasised that achieving no net loss in ecological
value did not necessarily infer no net loss in distributive justice:
So you’ve got the habitat and, there is no net loss [in ecological value], but the
benefits are lost to those individual people, that’s an equity issue, a social-justice
issue the green paper fails to deal with.
LPA2 felt the omission of equity concerns from the formal Biodiversity Offsetting
process would impose ‘‘cultural debts’’ on current and future generations, in the form of a
loss in access to environmental amenities which possess significant cultural, educational
and historical value to local people. Within the context of social compensation, EC1
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emphasised the importance of establishing free prior informed consent with communities
in which development was occurring, suggesting that if this criterion is not satisfied:
We need to be humble enough to admit that that is not an offset; it’s not even a
compensation.
EC2 agreed that failure to consult those affected by Biodiversity Offsetting undermined
the agency of affected communities:
It’s the responsibility of the democratic structure that we are living in. If things are
going to be changed in order to disable the rights of people in the community to have
a say over what happens with their landscape, then that’s a cut in democracy as far as
I’m concerned.
Notably, EC1 suggested that power dynamics would govern the degree of social
compensation resulting from Biodiversity Offsetting and concluded that a large landowner
would invariably have more influence over the planning process than the ‘‘people that have
the council housing on the outskirts’’. AR2 also suggested that poorer communities were
more likely
to accept remuneration or buy-offs than perhaps richer communities which would
have the luxury of saying no.
Similarly, AR3 expressed strong support for social compensation of affected communities
within the framework of Biodiversity Offsetting and the mitigation hierarchy, highlighting the
importance of access to nature in England compared with other nations, commenting:
We are a small island which is heavily developed with lots and lots of people living
very close to each other. I think access to nature is a huge part of the value of the
remaining biodiversity. So, I would say, actually yes, it is crucial that Biodiversity
Offsetting incorporates considerations of affected communities and access to nature
for those affected communities.
AR3 also noted the omission of social compensation within the Defra metric and
suggested its introduction via measurement of ecosystem service provision in the delivery
of an offset, concluding that ‘‘utility value and access to nature or something like that could
be made part of the Defra process without too much difficulty’’. AR3 went on to outline
how a more holistic approach to compensation might deliver co-benefits for local com-
munities as well as safeguarding natural habitats from development. The social-ecological
compensation attached would make it prohibitively expensive to offset biodiversity impact
retrospectively, driving ‘‘… the developers to look at more minimisation or avoidance
measures—which is kind of the point’’.
EC3 cited the case of Germany’s infrastructure planning law whereby if you ‘‘destroy
rights of way, you have to re-establish them’’, suggesting this as a useful requirement for
ensuring commensurate access to nature between a development site and offset site.
Despite recognising the distinct importance of public access to nature within the UK,
academic researchers and offset brokers highlighted a potential conflict between, on the
one hand providing a prosperous environment for biodiversity and ecosystems to thrive,
and on the other providing a suitable environment for access to green space. To this end,
offset brokers were less inclined to support the inclusion of social compensation within the
Defra metric, suggesting that such issues are, and would continue to be, dealt with
implicitly during the scoping and application of offsets with local authorities and via other
mechanisms surrounding green infrastructure.
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5 Discussion and conclusions
This article examines stakeholder perspectives towards the use of Biodiversity Offsetting
as a tool for conservation practice in England. Responses highlighted a broad landscape of
considerations surrounding the theoretical, practical and regulatory dimensions of the
Defra metric (Defra 2013b) and the 2013 UK pilot projects. Foremost, this analysis pro-
vides further evidence that the requirements for achieving no net loss are poorly defined in
conservation practice in England (Bull et al. 2013; Sullivan and Hannis 2015). The highly
normative definitions of no net loss transcend simple ecological compensation criteria.
Instead, our findings redress the notion of ‘‘loss’’ within this context along both ecological
and sociocultural lines. This finding is symptomatic of the broader disjuncture between
scholars and practitioners around defining what conservation actually means (Sandbrook
2015).
Conceptualising the type of compensation involved in an offset remains poorly inves-
tigated, yet has significant implications for the compensation of biodiversity loss and
communities dependent on nature (Bull et al. 2013; Gonc¸alves et al. 2015). At present ‘no
net loss’ is a misnomer for the actual costs associated with biodiversity loss (Carver 2015;
Sullivan and Hannis 2015). Our interviews with conservation stakeholders (academic
researchers, offset brokers, environmental campaigners and local planning authorities)
highlighted ecological compensation and social compensation as equally important.
However, at present, social compensation represents a major blind-spot within the Defra
offsetting metric, as illustrated in this study and as noted in an appraisal of the Biodiversity
Offsetting projects in England:
The restricted range of ecosystem services valued also meant some of the potentially
larger social and wellbeing benefits of access to nature were not fully considered.
(Defra 2013a)
Ostensibly, the findings of this article would suggest a greater mainstreaming of socio-
ecological issues associated within biodiversity loss to be a sensible improvement to the
Defra metric, which largely only considers habitat type and quality in compensating
biodiversity loss. Indeed, as AR3 suggested, formal requirements to compensate com-
munity losses, such as access to nature, as part of the Defra metric, could create a more
robust safeguard for the protection of an ecological site in the first instance. Equally,
incorporating wider ecological parameters into the assessment and implementation of
Biodiversity Offsetting to bolster ecological compensation (around proximity, equivalence,
ecosystem processes and longevity) would implicitly factor issues related to distributive
and procedural justice into the offsetting equation, resulting in greater social compensation.
At present, some of these values are dealt with using multipliers, where gains are scaled to
be greater than losses; however, as Bull et al. (2017) notes, there may be cases in which
such measures are incapable of meaningfully compensating for biodiversity loss, partic-
ularly where ethical and sociocultural values are concerned. Without due attention to social
compensation, biodiversity offsetting could transform sites of previous common heritage
into gated ecological offset sites (Sullivan 2012).
On closer inspection, however, extending the framework of no net loss to recognise and
accommodate additional ecological parameters and social equity concerns in Biodiversity
Offsetting is neither a workable solution nor a desirable outcome for conservation. Indeed,
the Defra metric, as with other systems of classification in market-based conservation,
captures only the ‘‘nature that capital can see’’ (Robertson 2006a, b). Consideration of, and
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compensation for complex issues linked to social and ecological compensation of biodi-
versity loss appear incompatible with the goal of bundling nature into ‘‘biodiversity units’’.
A key element to the consolidation of the value of biodiversity within this context is the
manner in which ‘‘those implicated in the accumulation of value are also those implicated
in the attribution of value itself’’ (Fairhead et al. 2012). To this end, it is important to
critically reflect on what is being defined as the value of biodiversity, and by whom (Maron
et al. 2016). Even if attempts were made to integrate such issues, to appease local com-
munities and the scientific community, they would invariably involve conflating,
abstracting and equating complex issues within the assessment of biodiversity loss, placing
them at greater risk of being misappropriated, traded off or crudely compensated, rather
than legitimised. Supposing the recommendations of respondents were meaningfully
reflected in conservation practice in England, the instrument(s) used to safeguard
ecosystems, biodiversity and the nature–society relationship would be almost unrecog-
nisable from Biodiversity Offsetting in its current, or improved form.
Biodiversity Offsetting is evolving in the vanguard of an international appetite for
accounting-driven conservation, in which the use of indicators to measure trends in bio-
diversity loss can be seen across several policy agendas (Benabou 2014). The recently
adopted UN Sustainable Development Goals explicitly use no net loss style indicators to
monitor trends in biodiversity; for example, Target 15.2 on sustainable forest management
employs an indicator which monitors ‘‘Net permanent forest loss’’ (UN Economic and
Social Council 2016). The direction of the EU’s Biodiversity Strategy over the last
20 years also illustrates a shift in the goal-post of conservation from no loss to no net loss
(European Commission 1993, 2006, 2012). There are at least 56 countries which are
estimated to have laws or policies requiring biodiversity offsets or some form of com-
pensatory conservation, encompassing over 100 schemes (OECD 2016). Within these
different contexts in which biodiversity offsetting is gaining traction, it is important to
observe whether the increasing classification and measurement of biodiversity will reduce
or strengthen accountability for biodiversity loss and associated responsibilities for its
compensation (Tregidga 2013). How will Biodiversity Offsetting shape ‘red lines’ for the
protection of ecosystems and biodiversity, and who are the winners and losers in each
case? In order to understand this quantitative assessment of conservation interventions
needs to be complemented with qualitative evaluation and ground-truthing, drawing on
practitioner and stakeholder surveys in order to identify and resolve issues associated with
conservation programmes (Tittensor et al. 2014; Tallis and Lubchenco 2014). Such form of
inquiry, as undertaken in this study, and by others within this context (Apostolopoulou
2016; Carver 2015; Carver and Sullivan 2017; Sullivan and Hannis 2015), provide a
crucial step in helping to unpack the underlying decisions, preferences and trade-offs
involved in conservation activities, which are at risk of being veiled within ‘‘units of
biodiversity’’ via the use of instruments such as Biodiversity Offsetting (Spash 2015).
In taking forward this agenda, we identify three immediate research gaps that require
further investigation, set out below.
First, we recommend a similar qualitative inquiry into the attitudes of landowners to
allocating land for offset sites, to help verify the mechanisms through which biodiversity
offsets might operate in England (Lawton et al. 2010). It has been widely reported that
farmers have productivist or traditionalist mindsets and see land as the preserve of agri-
cultural production (Howley 2015; Howley et al. 2015; McCracken et al. 2015).
Second, building on the UK Law Commission Conservation Covenants investigation
(UK Law Commission 2014), we identify a clear need for research into the development of
a uniform system of protecting offset sites via conservation covenants and the challenges
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presented by the seemingly disparate application of approaches to offsetting between
different local authorities.
Third, future work around siting controversies needs to view the process of ‘‘accu-
mulation by dispossession’’ in relation to the conversion of public commons to private
land, between a development site and an offset site, but also as a process of dispossession
at the offset site, particularly where poor property rights regimes give rise to land grabbing
for so-called Fortress Conservation (Bu¨scher 2016; Hackett 2016).
The analysis in this article offers a rationale to reconnect the offsetting debate with a
deeper understanding of the diverse socio-ecological values associated with biodiversity
loss, which is long overdue. This message is also salient within the burgeoning interna-
tional application of Biodiversity Offsetting, where treatment of social equity and justice
issues remain at the peripheries of scholarship and practice.
6 Supplementary information
Full transcripts from all interviews can be found online here: dataverse.harvard.edu/
dataverse.xhtml?alias=biodiversityoffsetting.
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Appendix 1: Respondents in study
Position Group Relevant expertise
Professor of ecology Academic
researchers
Provided input to UK Biodiversity
Offsetting consultation. Experience
working extensively on the relationships
between biodiversity, and ecosystem
services functioning, and conservation
policy
Engagement officer and researcher Academic
researchers
Conducted research on behalf of the UK
Government on the merits and limitations
of Biodiversity Offsetting
Lecturer on biodiversity Academic
researchers
Expert in restorative ecology and has
advised widely on the topic of
Biodiversity Offsetting
Director of environmental campaigning
organisation
Environmental
campaigners
Involvement in campaigning on
Biodiversity Offsetting and sell-off of
UK Forest Estate
Researcher and campaigner at major
European environmental NGO
Environmental
campaigners
Engagement with research and
campaigning on Biodiversity Offsetting
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Position Group Relevant expertise
Leader in International biodiversity Policy
at major global environmental NGO
Environmental
campaigners
Coordinated response to EU No Net Loss
consultation and has knowledge of
implementation of Biodiversity
Offsetting in France, Germany and the
UK
Principal ecologist from, local authority in
Warwickshire County Council
Local planning
authorities
Responsible for implementing Biodiversity
Offsetting pilot in Warwickshire
Senior practitioner in nature conservation,
Nottinghamshire County Council
Local planning
authorities
Responsible for implementing biodiversity
pilot in Nottinghamshire
Senior practitioner in nature conservation,
Devonshire County Council
Local planning
authorities
Responsible for implementing biodiversity
pilot in Devon
National Programme manager in private
sector organisation who has dealt with
brokering deals between developers with
landowners to achieve offsets
Offset brokers Involved in Essex Biodiversity Ofsetting
pilot. Previous experience as an offset
broker in the Australian BushBroker
scheme and extensive experience scoping
receptor sites for Biodiversity Offsetting
Project manager in private sector
organisation who has dealt with
brokering deals between developers with
landowners to achieve offsets
Offset brokers Involved in Essex Biodiversity Offsetting
pilot and liaising with planning teams at
the county and borough planning
authorities to calculate credit
requirements of development proposals
Biodiversity leader at major planning,
engineering and construction
management organisation
Offset brokers Experience of scoping Biodiversity
Offsetting projects in the UK
Appendix 2: Interview guide
Mainstreaming Biodiversity Offsetting into the planning system
Are biodiversity offsets likely to lead to tighter or less stringent regulations around
infrastructure projects?
Based on your experience, do you think Biodiversity Offsetting should be made
mandatory for infrastructure projects?
What is your opinion regarding the adoption of a ‘no net loss’ policy goal?
Equity considerations
When undertaking biodiversity offsets, do you think compensating affected communities is
always necessary and practical?
To what extent do you think the benefits derived from ecosystems are amenable to
economic valuation?
Agenda-building capacity
What do you think the role of market-based instruments is in reversing biodiversity loss?
What affect do you think the increasing emphasis on market-based instruments for
reversing biodiversity loss will have on conservation objectives?
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What role does Biodiversity Offsetting play in realising the goals of the Natura 2000
network and increasing conservation in UK and EU?
Biodiversity Offsetting in practice
Is the mitigation hierarchy a well-recognised framework for infrastructure development?
What opportunities are posed by private sector provision of biodiversity offsetting?
What risks are posed by private sector provision of biodiversity offsetting?
What factors should determine the location of an offset with respect to an affected
community?
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